

# Information Security Management

## Chapter 8 Risk Management: Assessing and Controlling Risk

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“Weakness is a better teacher  
than strength.  
Weakness must learn  
to understand the obstacles  
that strength brushes aside.”

-- Mason Cooley  
(1927-)

“Conan, what is good in life?”

“To crush your enemies,  
to drive them before you,  
& to hear the lamentations of their women!”

-- Conan the Barbarian,  
25,675 BCE

Upon completion of this chapter,  
you should be able to:

Understand and select  
from the risk mitigation strategy options  
to control risk

Identify the risk control classification categories

Use existing conceptual frameworks  
to evaluate risk controls,  
& formulate a cost benefit analysis

Maintain and perpetuate risk controls

Understand the OCTAVE approach to managing risk,  
& locate more detailed information about it  
if & when necessary

To keep up with the competition,  
organizations must design & create  
a safe environment  
in which business processes & procedures  
can function

This environment must

- ✓ Maintain confidentiality & privacy
- ✓ Assure the integrity & availability  
of organizational data

These objectives are met  
via the application of the principles  
of risk management

An organization must choose one of 4 basic strategies to control risks:

Avoidance: applying safeguards that eliminate or reduce the remaining uncontrolled risks for the vulnerability

Transference: shifting the risk to other areas or to outside entities

Mitigation: reducing the impact should the vulnerability be exploited

Acceptance: understanding the consequences & accept the risk without control or mitigation

Avoidance: “Don’t go near the bear.”

Transference: “Get the bear to chase **you**.”

Mitigation: “Wear bear armor.”

Acceptance: “Here comes the bear. Oh well.”

**Avoidance** is the risk control strategy that attempts to prevent the exploitation of the vulnerability

Avoidance is accomplished through:

- ✓ Application of policy
- ✓ Application of training & education
  - ✓ Countering threats
  - ✓ Implementation of technical security controls & safeguards



**Transference** is the control approach that attempts to shift the risk to other assets, other processes, or other organizations

May be accomplished by:

- ✓ Rethinking how services are offered

  - ✓ Revising deployment models

- ✓ Outsourcing to other organizations

  - ✓ Purchasing insurance

- ✓ Implementing service contracts with providers

**Mitigation** is the control approach that attempts to reduce, by means of planning & preparation, the damage caused by the exploitation of vulnerability

This approach includes 3 types of plans:

- ✓ Disaster recovery plan (DRP)
- ✓ Incident response plan (IRP)
- ✓ Business continuity plan (BCP)

Mitigation depends upon the ability to detect & respond to an attack as quickly as possible

**TABLE 8-1** Summaries of Mitigation Plans

Plan	Description	Example	When deployed	Timeframe
Incident Response Plan (IRP)	Actions an organization takes during incidents (attacks)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>■ List of steps to be taken during disaster</li><li>■ Intelligence gathering</li><li>■ Information analysis</li></ul>	As incident or disaster unfolds	Immediate and real-time reaction
Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>■ Preparations for recovery should a disaster occur</li><li>■ Strategies to limit losses before and during disaster</li><li>■ Step-by-step instructions to regain normalcy</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>■ Procedures for the recovery of lost data</li><li>■ Procedures for the reestablishment of lost services</li><li>■ Shutdown procedures to protect systems and data</li></ul>	Immediately after the incident is labeled a disaster	Short-term recovery
Business Continuity Plan (BCP)	Steps to ensure continuation of the overall business when the scale of a disaster exceeds the DRP's ability to quickly restore operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>■ Preparation steps for activation of secondary data centers</li><li>■ Establishment of a hot site in a remote location</li></ul>	Immediately after the disaster is determined to affect the continued operations of the organization	Long-term operation

**Acceptance** is the choice  
to do nothing  
to protect an information asset  
& to accept the loss when it occurs

This control, or lack of control,  
assumes that  
it may be a prudent business decision to

- ✓ Examine alternatives
  - ✓ Conclude the cost  
of protecting an asset  
does not justify the security expenditure


# Only valid use of acceptance strategy occurs when organization has:

- ✓ Determined level of risk to information asset
  - ✓ Assessed probability of attack & likelihood of a successful exploitation of vulnerability
  - ✓ Approximated ARO of the exploit
  - ✓ Estimated potential loss from attacks
- ✓ Performed a thorough cost benefit analysis
  - ✓ Evaluated controls using each appropriate type of feasibility
  - ✓ Decided that the particular asset did not justify the cost of protection

**Risk control** involves  
selecting 1 of the 4 risk control strategies  
for the vulnerabilities  
present within the organization

If the loss is within the range of losses  
the organization can absorb,  
or if the attacker's gain  
is less than expected costs of the attack,  
the organization may choose  
to accept the risk

Otherwise, 1 of the other control strategies  
will have to be selected



**FIGURE 8-2** Risk-Handling Action Points

# Some rules

**When a vulnerability exists:**

Implement security controls  
to reduce the likelihood  
of a vulnerability being exercised

**When a vulnerability can be exploited:**

Apply layered controls  
to minimize the risk or prevent occurrence

**When the attacker's potential gain  
is greater than the costs of attack:**


Apply protections to increase the attacker's cost,  
or reduce the attacker's gain,  
using technical or managerial controls

**When potential loss is substantial:**

Apply design controls  
to limit the extent of the attack,  
thereby reducing the potential for loss



Once a control strategy  
has been selected & implemented,  
the effectiveness of controls  
should be monitored & measured  
on an ongoing basis  
to determine its effectiveness



**FIGURE 8-3** Risk Control Cycle

Controlling risk by means of avoidance, mitigation, or transference may be accomplished by implementing controls or safeguards

Controls can be grouped for discussion by 1 of 4 categories:

- ✓ Control function
- ✓ Architectural layer
  - ✓ Strategy layer
  - ✓ InfoSec principle

## Preventive controls

Stop attempts to exploit a vulnerability  
by implementing enforcement  
of an organizational policy  
or a security principle

Use a technical procedure,  
or some combination  
of technical means & enforcement methods

## Detective controls

Warn organizations  
of violations of security principles,  
organizational policies,  
or attempts to exploit vulnerabilities

Use techniques such as  
audit trails,  
intrusion detection,  
& configuration monitoring

Some controls apply  
to one or more layers  
of an organization's technical architecture

Possible architectural layers  
include the following:

- ✓ Organizational policy
  - ✓ External networks
    - ✓ Extranets
  - ✓ Demilitarized zones
    - ✓ Intranets
- ✓ Network devices that interface network zones
  - ✓ Systems
  - ✓ Applications

Controls are sometimes classified  
by the risk control strategy  
they operate within:

- ✓ Avoidance
- ✓ Mitigation
- ✓ Transference

Note that the acceptance strategy  
is not an option  
since it involves the absence of controls

Risk controls operate  
within one or more  
of the commonly accepted  
information security principles:

- ✓ Confidentiality
  - ✓ Integrity
  - ✓ Availability
- ✓ Authentication
- ✓ Authorization
- ✓ Accountability
  - ✓ Privacy



Before deciding on the strategy for a specific vulnerability, all readily accessible information about the consequences of the vulnerability must be explored

“What are the advantages of implementing a control as opposed to the disadvantages of implementing the control?”

Number of ways to determine advantage or disadvantage of a specific control

Primary means are based on the value of information assets that control is designed to protect

**Economic Feasibility:**  
criterion most commonly used  
when evaluating a project  
that implements  
infosec controls & safeguards

Organizations are urged  
to begin a cost benefit analysis (CBA),  
or economic feasibility study.  
by evaluating

- ✓ Worth of the information assets to be protected
  - ✓ Loss in value
- if those information assets are compromised

Just as it is difficult to determine the value of information, it is difficult to determine the cost of safeguarding it

Some of the items that affect the cost of a control or safeguard include:

- ✓ Cost of development or acquisition of hardware, software, and services
  - ✓ Training fees
  - ✓ Cost of implementation
    - ✓ Service costs
  - ✓ Cost of maintenance

**Benefit** is the value to the organization  
of using controls  
to prevent losses  
associated with a specific vulnerability

Usually determined by:

- ✓ Valuing the information asset or assets  
exposed by vulnerability
- ✓ Determining how much of that value is at risk  
& how much risk there is for the asset

This is expressed as  
**the annualized loss expectancy (ALE)**

**Asset valuation** is the process of assigning financial value or worth to each information asset

Value of information differs within organizations & between organizations

Based on information characteristics & perceived value of that information

Valuation of assets involves estimation  
of real & perceived costs  
associated with:

design,  
development,  
installation,  
maintenance,  
protection,  
recovery,  
& defense against loss & litigation

# Some of the components of asset valuation include:

- ✓ Value retained from the cost of creating the information asset
- ✓ Value retained from past maintenance of the information asset
- ✓ Value implied by the cost of replacing the information
  - ✓ Value from providing the information
    - ✓ Value acquired from the cost of protecting the information
      - ✓ Value to owners
    - ✓ Value of intellectual property
      - ✓ Value to adversaries
      - ✓ Loss of productivity
- while the information assets are unavailable
  - ✓ Loss of revenue
- while information assets are unavailable

Organization must be able to place a dollar value on each information assets it owns, based on:

- ✓ How much did it cost to create or acquire?
- ✓ How much would it cost to recreate or recover?
  - ✓ How much does it cost to maintain?
- ✓ How much is it worth to the organization?
  - ✓ How much is it worth to the competition?



**Potential loss** is that  
which could occur  
from the exploitation of vulnerability  
or a threat occurrence

The questions that must be asked include:

- ✓ What loss could occur,  
& what financial impact would it have?
- ✓ What would it cost to recover from the attack,  
in addition to the financial impact of damage?
- ✓ What is the single loss expectancy for each risk?

Single loss expectancy (SLE):  
calculation of value  
associated with most likely loss  
from an attack

Based on asset value  
& expected percentage of loss  
that would occur from a particular attack:

$$\text{SLE} = \text{asset value (AV)} \times \text{exposure factor (EF)}$$

Where EF = the percentage loss  
that would occur  
from a given vulnerability being exploited

This information is usually estimated

In most cases,  
probability of a threat occurring  
is the probability of loss from an attack  
within a given time frame

Commonly referred to as the ARO,  
or **annualized rate of occurrence**

CBA determines  
whether or not a control alternative  
is worth its associated cost

CBA's may be calculated:

**Before** a control or safeguard  
is implemented to determine  
if the control is worth implementing

OR

**After** controls have been implemented  
& have been functioning for a time:  
$$CBA = ALE(\text{prior}) - ALE(\text{post}) - ACS$$

The CBA formula for  
$$\text{CBA} = \text{ALE}(\text{prior}) - \text{ALE}(\text{post}) - \text{ACS}$$

**ALE(prior to control)**

is the annualized loss expectancy  
of the risk

before the implementation of the control

**ALE(post control)**

is the ALE examined  
after the control has been in place  
for a period of time

**ACS** is the annual cost of the safeguard

**Organizational feasibility analysis**  
examines how well  
proposed InfoSec alternatives  
will contribute to operation of an organization  
by looking at  
user acceptance & support,  
management acceptance & support,  
& overall requirements  
of organization's stakeholders

**Technical feasibility** examines  
whether or not the organization has or can acquire  
the technology to implement  
& support the alternatives

**Political feasibility** defines  
what can & cannot occur  
based on the consensus & relationships  
between the communities of interest

# Benchmarking:

- ✓ Seeking out & studying practices of other organizations that produce desired results
  - ✓ Measuring differences between how organizations conduct business

When benchmarking, an organization typically uses 1 of 2 measures to compare practices:

- ✓ **Metrics-based** measures are comparisons based on numerical standards
  - ✓ **Process-based** measures are generally less focused on numbers & are more strategic

In the field of InfoSec,  
2 categories of benchmarks are used:

1. Standards of due care & due diligence
2. Best practices

Within best practices,  
the **gold standard**  
is a subcategory of practices  
that are typically viewed as  
“the best of the best”



For legal reasons,  
an organization may be forced to adopt  
a certain minimum level of security

When organizations adopt levels of security  
for legal defense, they may need to show  
that they have done what any prudent  
organization would do in similar  
circumstances; i.e., **due care**

**Due diligence** demonstrates  
that the organization is persistent  
in ensuring implemented standards  
continue to provide  
required levels of protection

**Best business practices:** security efforts  
that seek to provide  
a superior level of performance

Are among the best in the industry,  
balancing access to information  
with adequate protection,  
while maintaining a solid degree  
of fiscal responsibility

Companies with best practices  
may not be the best in every area

May simply have established  
an extremely high quality

42 or successful security effort in one or more areas

Even the best business practices  
are not sufficient for some organizations

These organizations aspire  
to set the standard  
by implementing  
the most protective, supportive,  
& yet fiscally responsible standards they can

The **gold standard** is  
a defining level of performance  
that demonstrates  
a company's industrial leadership, quality,  
& concern for the protection of information

Seeking the gold standard  
is a method of striving for excellence

When considering best practices for adoption,  
address the following questions:

Does your organization resemble the organization  
that implemented the best practice?

Is your organization in a similar industry?

Does your organization face similar challenges?

Is your organizational structure similar  
to the organization that implemented  
the best practice?

Can your organization expend resources  
that are in line with the requirements  
of the best practice?

Is your organization in a similar threat environment  
as the one cited in the best practice?

## Problems with benchmarking & best practices

- ✓ Organizations don't talk to each other
- ✓ No two organizations are identical
- ✓ Best practices are a moving target

- ✓ Simply knowing  
what was going on a few years ago  
does not necessarily indicate what to do next

**Baselining** is  
the analysis of measures  
against established standards

In InfoSec,  
baselining is the comparison  
of security activities & events  
against  
the organization's future performance

The information gathered  
for an organization's first risk assessment  
becomes the baseline for future comparisons

**Risk appetite** defines  
the quantity & nature of risk  
that organizations are willing to accept,  
as they evaluate the trade-offs  
between perfect security  
& unlimited accessibility

Reasoned approach to risk  
is one that  
balances expense  
against possible losses if exploited

When vulnerabilities have been controlled  
as much as possible,  
there is often remaining risk  
that has not been completely accounted for:  
**residual risk**


$$\begin{aligned} &\text{Residual risk} \\ &= \\ &\text{Risk from a threat} \\ &\quad \text{less the effect of} \\ &\quad \text{threat-reducing safeguards} \\ &+ \\ &\text{Risk from a vulnerability} \\ &\quad \text{less the effect of} \\ &\quad \text{vulnerability-reducing safeguards} \\ &+ \\ &\text{Risk to an asset} \\ &\quad \text{less the effect of} \\ &\quad \text{asset value-reducing safeguards} \end{aligned}$$



The significance of residual risk  
must be judged  
within the context  
of an organization's risk appetite

The goal of InfoSec  
is not to bring residual risk to zero,  
but to bring it in line  
with an organization's risk appetite

# Risk of information asset



**FIGURE 8-4** Residual Risk

When risk management program  
has been completed,  
series of proposed controls are prepared

Each justified by one or more  
feasibility or rationalization approaches

At minimum,  
each information asset-threat pair  
should have a documented control strategy  
that clearly identifies  
any residual risk remaining  
after the proposed strategy  
has been executed

Some organizations document  
outcome of control strategy  
for each information asset-threat pair  
in an **action plan**,  
which can include concrete tasks,  
each with accountability  
assigned to an organizational unit  
or to an individual

**Quantitative assessment**  
performs asset valuation  
with actual values or estimates

An organization could determine  
that it cannot put specific numbers  
on these values

Organizations could use  
**qualitative assessments** instead,  
using scales instead of specific estimates

# Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, & Vulnerability Evaluation<sup>SM</sup> (OCTAVE<sup>SM</sup>) Method:

Defines essential components  
of a comprehensive, systematic, context-driven,  
self-directed InfoSec risk evaluation

By following OCTAVE Method,  
organization can make  
information-protection decisions  
based on risks

to confidentiality, integrity, & availability  
of critical information technology assets

Operational or business units & IT department  
work together

54 to address InfoSec needs of the organization

# Phases of The OCTAVE Method

## Phase 1: Build Asset-Based Threat Profiles

### Organizational evaluation

Key areas of expertise within organization are examined to elicit important knowledge about:

- ✓ Information assets
- ✓ Threats to those assets
- ✓ Security requirements of assets
- ✓ What organization is currently doing to protect its information assets
- ✓ Weaknesses in organizational policies & practice

more ... →

## Phase 2: Identify Infrastructure Vulnerabilities

Evaluation of information infrastructure

Key operational components  
of information technology infrastructure  
are examined for weaknesses  
(technology vulnerabilities)  
that can lead to unauthorized action

more ... →



# Phase 3: Develop Security Strategy & Plans

Risks are analyzed in this phase

Information generated by  
organizational & information infrastructure evaluations  
(Phases 1 & 2)  
is analyzed to:

- ✓ Identify risks to organization
- ✓ Evaluate risks based on  
their impact to the organization's mission
- ✓ Organization protection strategy  
& risk mitigation plans  
for the highest priority risks are developed

# The OCTAVE Method:

Self directed

Requires analysis team  
to conduct evaluation & analyze information

Basic tasks of the team are to:

- ✓ Facilitate Phase 1's  
knowledge elicitation workshops
- ✓ Gather any necessary supporting data
  - ✓ Analyze threat & risk information
- ✓ Develop a protection strategy for the organization
  - ✓ Develop mitigation plans to address risks  
to the organization's critical assets

Uses workshop-based approach for gathering information & making decisions

Relies upon the following major catalogs of information:

- ✓ Catalog of practices:  
collection of good strategic  
& operational security practices

- ✓ Threat profile:  
range of major sources of threats  
that an organization needs to consider

- ✓ Catalog of vulnerabilities:  
collection of vulnerabilities  
based on platform & application

Each phase of the OCTAVE Method  
contains two or more processes

Each process is made of activities

Phase 1: Build Asset-Based Threat Profiles

Process 1:

Identify Senior Management Knowledge

Process 2:

Identify Operational Area Management Knowledge

Process 3: Identify Staff Knowledge

Process 4: Create Threat Profiles

## Phase 2: Identify Infrastructure Vulnerabilities

Process 5: Identify Key Components

Process 6: Evaluate Selected Components

## Phase 3: Develop Security Strategy & Plans

Process 7: Conduct Risk Analysis

Process 8: Develop Protection Strategy

# Preparing for the OCTAVE Method

- ✓ Obtain senior management sponsorship of OCTAVE
  - ✓ Select analysis team members
    - ✓ Train analysis team
  - ✓ Select operational areas to participate in OCTAVE
    - ✓ Select participants
    - ✓ Coordinate logistics
    - ✓ Brief all participants

For more information,  
download the  
Octave<sup>SM</sup> method implementation guide

<http://www.cert.org/octave/omig.html>

Summary

Introduction

Risk Control Strategies

Risk Control Strategy Selection

Categories of Controls

Feasibility Studies & Cost-Benefit Analysis

Risk Management Discussion Points

Recommended Risk Control Practices

The OCTAVE Method



Thank you!

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